For those who prefer to read this column in English, the Japanese text is followed by a British English translation, so please scroll down to the bottom of the Japanese text.

１．問題の発端と展開

「『タカタ』が、2000年から、2008年に掛けて製造したエアバッグに、破裂につながる不具合があり、社内で行なったエアバッグの部品の試験で『破裂につながる兆候が出た結果があった』にもかかわらず、それを隠蔽していた」と「ニューヨーク・タイムズ」が、2014年９月、そして11月に報道した。しかし、タカタはこの後開かれた米国議会の「公聴会」では、この「隠蔽」の事実を明確に否定した。

米国の「高速道路交通安全局（NHTSA）」が、「日本の自動車メーカーが、エアバッグの不具合に関連した死傷事故の報告を怠っていた可能性がある」として調査を開始、これを受けて米国の消費者が、2015年2月、「重要な情報を消費者に隠していた」として、タカタ、日本の自動車メーカー等12社に対して損害賠償を求めるクラスアクション（集団訴訟）を起こした。

2015年5月、タカタは、全面的にエアバッグの欠陥を認め、米国運輸省と全米で約3,400万台のリコール（回収・無償修理）をおこなうことを合意した。史上最大規模のリコールとなった。2017年1月、「隠蔽」を認め、和解金10億ドルを支払うことを米国司法省と合意した。同時に、タカタの元幹部3人が、製品の欠陥を隠蔽していたという詐欺罪で刑事訴追され、裁判所は、罰金と被害者補償基金、自動車メーカー向けの補償金、合計約10億ドルの支払いを命じる判決を下した。

2．経営破綻

メディアは、2017年4月タカタの主要債権者である自動車メーカーが、タカタの経営再建に向けた最終的な調整に入ったと伝えた。しかし、その規模、1兆円超を超えると予測されるリコール費用の大半を肩代わりするメーカーは、自社のガバナンスからも当然のごとく、裁判所の関与のもと、公平に負担額を確定させる法的整理を主張した。結果、同年6月、東京地裁に民事再生法の適用を申請、国内外のタカタ・グループ15社の負債総額は約4000億円。さらに、自動車メーカーがリコール費用を肩代わりした額は１兆3000億円に達し、それら「全負債総額」は1兆7000億円、米国での訴訟の進展によると、さらに負債は膨らむ可能性を秘めているものであった。

そして、民事再生法の適用を申請したタカタの債権者集会が、2018年5月東京地裁で開かれ、再生計画案が可決、東京地裁は計画を認可した。その確定債権は、1兆円を超える規模になった。その後、タカタは、「訴訟の発生している事業を切り離して優良事業となった、自社の主要事業」を中国系の米国の自動車部品メーカー、キー・セイフティー・システムズ（KSS）に15億8800万ドル（約1750億円）で譲渡、タカタ創業家３代目の会長兼社長は辞任、KSSがタカタを統合、社名をジョイソン・セイフティ・システムズに変更して、タカタは事実上、消滅した。

3，経営破綻の理由と背景

タカタは、リコール債務の拡大や米国での訴訟などで経営が悪化したが、それでも創業家は、「法的整理になれば創業家３代目の会長兼社長は、経営責任を取って辞任しなければならないため、会社更生法や民事再生手続きなどではなく、利害関係者の同意に基づく私的整理が望ましいと考えていた」と言われている。また、外部から招聘した社長の就任とともに、創業家３代目は一旦会長となったが、１年半で社長を解任、「欠陥エアバッグの対応を一元的に対処する」として、自身が会長兼社長として絶対的な権限を握ったが、全く事態を認識、把握できていない対応であったと言われている。

「一元的な対応」といいながら、米国運輸省からタカタ製エアバッグの欠陥を指摘されても、なかなか記者会見を開かなかった。このような状態の背景は、創業家の資産管理会社が53.6％、社長が2.9％、その実母が2.1％など、創業家だけで約6割の株を握っていたからである。ステークホルダーの意見が経営に反映されにくい背景が、「上場企業として当然の責務である説明責任」を果たさない無責任な体質を生んだと考えられる。

4．的確なリスクマネジメントは

もし、タカタに専門的な知識を有するリスクマネージャーが存在していたらどのようなリスクマネジメントをおこなっていたであろうか。会社の歴史と業容から、シミュレーションをしてみたい。
1． 1933年：創業、織物製造を開始して、その技術を活かした救命索も製造を開始した。
2． 1960年：日本初の自動車用二点式シートベルトを開発、販売を開始。
3． 1987年：日本の大手自動車メーカーと日本初の国産エアバッグを共同開発、エアバッグの製造・販売を開始。
4． 2006年： 東京証券取引所に上場。
5． 2017年：主要事業停止前の世界のセグメント情報を見ると、売上高、利益ともに大きいのが米州、その大半は米国であったが、そこで全体の営業利益の約3割を出していた。タカタの最大の主戦場は米国であった。

賠償責任リスクへのリスクマネジメント・シミュレーション

1． もし、筆者がリスクマネージャーであれば、まず、「2．」の段階で、十分な保険プログラムの構築の交渉を始め、「発生してくるリスク」への準備を開始する。理由は、当時は、まだ損害保険会社の商品構成には十分なものは無い時代であったが、「人の命を護る」という商品の特性上、それが機能しなかった場合の損害賠償責任は非常に大きくなることが予測されるからである。まだ、商品が未発達であった時代の損害保険業界であったが、適格な損害保険会社に相談、交渉して、自社が被る損害賠償責任を想定した「自社用の特別な損害保険プログラム」を構築する方向へ進めていく。

2． 「3．」の段階に至ると、明らかに「リスクは顕在化してきている」ので、相当な陣容でリスクマネジメントをおこない、その対応策を入念に検討、実行する。理由としては、1987年当時、日本のある大手自動車メーカーは「F1」で優勝を重ねるなど、日本の自動車メーカーの海外進出は非常に進んでおり、特に米国では、日本車不買運動が「デトロイト発」で起きるほど、日本車は米国での販売台数を伸ばしていた。一方、米国は「訴訟大国」、「救急車が走っていたらそれを追っかけ行って訴訟沙汰にする」という意味で、「アンビュランス・チェーサー（救急車追跡者）」と弁護士が呼ばれるような国である。

さらに、米国には、日本には無い、「クラスアクション」（集団訴訟）と呼ばれる訴訟形態がある。「ある行為や事件によって、多数の者が同じような被害を受けたとき、受ける可能性があると推定されるとき、一部の被害者が全体を代表して訴訟を起こすことを認める制度」である。これによって、「損害賠償額が飛躍的に上がる可能性」がある、その背景は「陪審員制度」である。日本の裁判員制度では、法律の専門家である裁判官も裁判員と一緒に審理するが、米国では一般市民から選ばれた陪審員のみで審理、評決するため、「自分たちもこういう目に遭ったら」という観点から、法律理論よりも、一般市民の感情が優先される傾向が強く、エキセントリックな常識的ではない判決が出やすい傾向がある。こういう国へ、会社の事業の3割の商品を出荷して、また会社全体の3割の利益を得ているとしたら、不測の事態への対処方法は、十二分に、検討、考慮しなければならないことである。

日本の損害保険会社が有している、賠償責任保険のキャパシティ（引受能力）では、米国の高額賠償に備えることは不可能であるから、海外に「キャプティブ」を設立して、海外の賠償責任保険のキャパシティを集めて「米国用の賠償責任保険プログラム」を構築する。この場合も、損害保険会社毎に、「引受を得意とする賠償責任限度額」が異なるので、賠償責任限度額を5層程度に別けて、それぞれの層毎に数社以上の損害保険会社のシェアイン（引受参加）を交渉、巨額の損害賠償にも耐え得るプログラムを構築する。

3． さらに、東京証券取引所への上場は2006年であるが、米国の場合、「会社役員への訴訟」は「会社を訴訟」する時に同時におこなわれるのが一般的であるため、会社が訴訟された時に備え、「会社を護る十分な損害賠償責任保険」を手配することと同時に、「会社役員賠償責任保険（D&O保険）」にも、高額の補償額で加入することを全役員（取締役・執行役員）へ勧め、加入させる。これによって、「会社」と「経営者」を護ることができ、「賠償責任リスクに対して、真に会社を護るリスクマネジメントプログラム」を完成することができる。

今回のまとめ

上記のような最大限の努力をして、最善のリスクマネジメントプログラムを構築しても、重要なことは、その「武器」を使う経営陣がその任に堪えられない場合、意味を成さなくなるということである。タカタの場合も、果たしてその任に耐えられる経営者であったのか、ことの顛末を知れば知るほど、非常に疑問を感じる。主戦場である、米国での「事故後の説明会」にトップが姿を見せないことが、どれほど信用を失うことになるのか、容易に判断できるはずであるが、この重要な節目にもその姿は無く、ここから大きく潮目が変わったと言われている。

おそらく、リスクマネジメントも「保険会社任せ」であったのではないだろうか。世界のシェアの20％を握る優良企業の幕切れにしては、あまりにもあっけなく、非常に残念である。キャプティブの設立を視野に入れた、本格的なリスクマネジメントが企業戦略にとっては最重要課題であることを証明するようなできごとであったと言えるであろう。結論としては、「タカタには、適格な『リスクマネージャー』の存在が無かった」と推測できる事象である。

執筆・翻訳者：羽谷 信一郎

English Translation

Risk Management 47 -Takata

On August 26, 2020, Kyodo News reported the following: “Honda pays 10 billion yen to settle lawsuit over defective airbags.”

On August 25, Honda announced that it has settled a lawsuit in almost every state in the United States over defective airbags manufactured by Takata, paying 96 million dollars (about 10.2 billion yen) in damages. The agreement was reached without any admission of negligence. The lawsuit covers 46 states and the capital city of Washington (District of Columbia), among others. As part of the settlement, the parties also agreed to strengthen safety measures for airbags installed in the front seats.

In addition, on October 3, Jiji Press reported the following story: “Takata airbags kill more people in the US.”

On October 3, Honda announced the cause of the fatal accident in Arizona in August was the abnormal explosion of a Takata airbag. The driver was killed in the accident. This is the 17th death in the United States to be linked to a defective airbag, 15 of which were in Honda vehicles. According to the announcement, the car that caused the accident was a 2002 Civic, a small car that was recalled (recalled and repaired free of charge) in December 2011. Honda notified the owner of the car multiple times to respond to the recall, including by visiting the car’s owner, but the car had not yet been repaired. The owner of the car and the driver who died are not the same, the company said.

Why did Takata, a superb company that had been in business for more than 80 years and had a 20% share of the global market for airbags and a 20% share of the global market for seat belts, fall apart in such a short period of time? However, the company failed to recognize that the auto parts manufacturing industry was an industry that had the potential to turn into a huge risk once a risk arose, and failed to take any action at all. This means that “risk management” was not even the rudiments of risk management at all.

1. The genesis and development of the problem

“Takata covered up the fact that the airbags it manufactured between 2000 and 2008 were faulty, despite tests of airbag components that ‘showed signs of rupturing'”, according to the “New York Times” in September 2014. and reported on it in November. However, Takata categorically denied this “cover-up” at a congressional “hearing” held later in the day.

The U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) launched an investigation into the possibility that the Japanese automaker may have failed to report fatalities and injuries related to airbag failures, and in response, U.S. consumers filed a class action lawsuit in February 2015 against Takata, the Japanese automaker, and 12 other companies seeking damages for “concealing important information from consumers”.

In May 2015, Takata fully admitted to the airbag defect and agreed with the U.S. Department of Transportation to recall (recall or free repair) approximately 34 million vehicles across the United States. In January 2017, Takata admitted to the “cover-up” and agreed with the U.S. Department of Justice to pay $1 billion in a settlement, making it the largest recall in history. At the same time, three former Takata executives were criminally charged with fraud for covering up product defects, and the court ordered them to pay fines, a victims’ compensation fund, and compensation for the automaker, totaling about $1 billion.

2. Business failure

The media reported that in April 2017 Takata’s major creditors, the automaker, had entered into final arrangements to restructure Takata’s operations. However, the manufacturer, which is responsible for most of the recall costs, which were expected to exceed ¥1 trillion in size, insisted on a legal arrangement that would fairly fix the amount owed, with the involvement of the courts, as is natural for its own governance. As a result, in June of that year, the automaker filed for bankruptcy protection under the Civil Rehabilitation Law with the Tokyo District Court, and the total debt of the 15 domestic and overseas Takata Group companies was about 400 billion yen. In addition, the automaker had covered the cost of the recalls to 1.3 trillion yen, bringing its total liabilities to 1.7 trillion yen, and as the U.S. lawsuits progressed, there was the possibility that the amount could grow even higher.

Then, in May 2018, a meeting of Takata’s creditors, who had applied for the Civil Rehabilitation Law, was held at the Tokyo District Court, and the Tokyo District Court approved the plan. Its confirmed claims are now more than 1 trillion yen in size. Subsequently, Takata sold “its main business, which has become a good business after separating its litigated business,” to Key Safety Systems (KSS), a Chinese-owned U.S. auto parts manufacturer, for $1.588 billion (approximately ¥175 billion), and the third generation of the Takata founding family resigned as chairman and president, with KSS’ Takata merged and changed its name to Joyson Safety Systems, and Takata effectively ceased to exist.

3. Reasons and background of the collapse of Takata’s business

Although Takata’s financial situation has deteriorated due to increased recall liabilities and lawsuits in the United States, the founding family still believes that the third-generation chairman and president of Takata would have to take responsibility for management and resign if the company were to be legally liquidated, and therefore a private liquidation based on the consent of interested parties is preferable to the Corporate Reorganization Act or civil rehabilitation proceedings. It is said that he was thinking about it. With the appointment of an externally invited president, the third generation of the founding family became chairman of the board, but after a year and a half, he was dismissed from the position and assumed absolute authority as chairman and president of the board, with the intention of “unifying the response to the defective airbags”. It is said that this was a response that was completely unaware of the situation, and that this was a complete lack of understanding of the situation.

Despite this claim of centralized control, Takata refused to hold a press conference when the U.S. Department of Transportation pointed out the defects in Takata’s airbags. The reason for this state of affairs is that the founding family alone held about 60% of the shares in the company, with the founding family’s asset management company holding 53.6% of the shares, the president holding 2.9%, and his own mother holding 2.1%. It is difficult for the opinions of stakeholders to be reflected in the management of the company, and this is thought to have contributed to the irresponsibility of the company in not fulfilling its accountability, which is a natural responsibility for a listed company.

4. Accurate risk management

What kind of risk management would Takata would have done if it had an expert risk manager? Let’s look at the company’s history and business operations and simulate the situation.
(1) 1933: The company was founded and began manufacturing textiles and lifelines using its technology.
(2) 1960: The company developed and started to sell Japan’s first two-point seat belt for automobiles.
(3) 1987: The company developed Japan’s first domestically produced airbags in partnership with a major Japanese automaker and began manufacturing and selling them.
(4) 2006: The company was listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
(5) 2017: Looking at global segment information prior to the cessation of major operations, the Americas was the largest segment in terms of both sales and profits, the majority of which were in the U.S., where Takata generated about 30% of its total operating profit. The U.S. was Takata’s largest major battleground.

Risk Management Simulation for Liability Risk

(1) If the author were a risk manager, the first step would be to begin negotiating the construction of an adequate insurance program and start preparing for the “risks that arise” at the “2.” stage. The reason for this is that, at that time, there was still no adequate product structure for property and casualty insurance companies, but due to the nature of the product to “protect people’s lives”, the liability for damages can be expected to be very high if it does not work. At a time when products were still underdeveloped in the non-life insurance industry, the company consulted and negotiated with qualified non-life insurance companies and proceeded to establish a “special non-life insurance program for its own use” that envisioned its own liability for damages.

(2) When we reach the stage of “3,” it is clear that the risk has become apparent, so we have to manage the risk with a considerable team and carefully consider and implement countermeasures. One reason for this is that in 1987, Japanese automobile manufacturers were making great strides in their overseas operations, with one major Japanese automobile manufacturer winning a series of Formula One championships. The US, on the other hand, is a “litigation powerhouse,” a country where lawyers are known as “ambulance chasers” in the sense that if an ambulance is running, they will chase it down and get involved in a lawsuit.

Furthermore, the United States has a form of litigation called a “class action” that does not exist in Japan. This is “a system that allows some victims to file a lawsuit on behalf of the whole when a number of people are similarly harmed by an act or incident and it is presumed that they are likely to be harmed. This has the “potential to dramatically increase the amount of damages”, the background of which is the “jury system”. In Japan’s jury system, judges, who are legal experts, try cases together with juries, but in the U.S., juries are selected from the general public and the emotions of the public tend to take precedence over the legal theories of what they would do if they were subjected to this kind of situation, which is why the jury system in the U.S. is based on eccentric common sense. There is a tendency to make decisions that are not on target. If a company ships 30% of its business to such a country and earns 30% of the company’s total profits, the method of dealing with unforeseen circumstances is something that should be fully considered and examined.

It is impossible for Japanese non-life insurance companies to prepare for high value claims in the United States with their capacity in liability insurance, so they should set up a “captive” overseas to build a “liability insurance program for the United States” by gathering overseas liability insurance capacities. Again, because each non-life insurance company has different liability limits that it is good at underwriting, we will divide the liability limits into five or so tiers, and negotiate with several or more non-life insurance companies to participate in sharing in the program for each tier to build a program that can withstand large amounts of damages.

(3) In addition, since the company was listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 2006, in the U.S., lawsuits against directors and officers are generally filed at the same time as lawsuits against the company, the company should arrange sufficient liability insurance to protect the company in case the company is sued. The company should encourage all officers (directors and executive officers) to purchase D&O insurance with a high coverage amount and have them purchase it as well. This will protect the company and management, and will enable them to complete a risk management program that truly protects the company against liability risks.

Summary of this issue

Even with the best risk management program in place, as described above, it is important to note that even the best risk management program will be useless if the management team that uses” the weapon” is not up to the task. In the case of Takata, the more I learn about what happened, the more I doubt that the management team was up to the task. It should be easy to judge how much credibility was lost when Takata’s top management did not show up for post-accident briefings in the United States, the main battleground for the company, but they were not present at this important point in time either, and it is said that the tide has now turned.

Perhaps risk management was also “left to the insurance companies”. It is very disappointing that the end of a blue-chip company with a 20% share of the global market was so short-lived. It was an event that proved that full-scale risk management, with a view to establishing a captive, is the most important aspect of corporate strategy.In conclusion, this event suggests that Takata did not have a qualified risk manager.

Author/translator: Shinichiro Hatani